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SPLITTING THE BABY: THE DEATH OF SMALL BUSINESS 
Brian T. Kloeblen 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS 
Act), Congress gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the 
Commission) three new tools for small business capital formation.1  First, 
Title II of the JOBS Act allows for broad solicitation of investors for 
offerings under Rule 506.2  Second, Title III of the JOBS Act allows for 
offerings of up to $1 million through crowdfunding over the Internet.3  Third, 
Title IV of the JOBS Act focuses on small business capital formation through 
the addition of section 3(b)(2) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 
(Securities Act).4  The SEC’s unworkable and ineffective implementation of 
Title IV, commonly referred to as Regulation A+, will be the main focus of 
this Comment. 
Although there was initial enthusiasm in anticipation of the final 
Regulation A+ rules,5 the final rules as adopted by the SEC are unlikely to 
provide any relief for small businesses that are in desperate need of external 
capital.  This is due in large part to the SEC’s failure to balance investor 
protection and the promotion of “efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”6  The final rules for Regulation A+ are plagued with over-
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 1  Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(b)(2), 126 
Stat. 306, 323–24 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (2012)); see also Rutheford B. Campbell, 
Jr., The SEC’s Regulation A+: Small Business Goes Under the Bus Again, 104 KY. L.J. 325, 
345 (2016).   
 2  Campbell, supra note 1, at 345 (“Rule 506(c) now permits a broad solicitation for 
investors, imposing the investor protection provision—which is the accredited status of the 
investors—at the point of purchase. The correct implicit assumption of this is that no material 
harm to investors results from the broad solicitation, so long as the purchasers meet the 
accredited investor requirement.”).   
 3  Id.  (stating essentially, this permits small issuers to post their offerings on the Internet 
but prohibits any other sales activities).   
 4  15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (2012).   
 5  See Michael Raneri, Raising Growth Capital via Regulation A+, CFO (May 29, 2015), 
http://ww2.cfo.com/credit-capital/2015/05/raising-growth-capital-via-regulation/.   
 6  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,864 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
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regulation, which defeats Regulation A+’s own underlying goal: reducing 
costs for capital formation by small businesses.7  While governmental 
regulation of the formation of capital has its historic roots and serves a clear 
beneficial purpose,8 that same regulation must be reasonable so as not to 
extinguish the entrepreneurial spirit that drives our economy forward. 
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief background of the history 
of securities regulation.  Part III traces the evolution of Regulation A and 
other relevant portions of the Securities Act.  Part IV provides an overview 
and explanation of the final rules for Regulation A+ that were adopted by the 
SEC.  Part V compares the final rules with the myriad of superior alternatives 
that the SEC ignored.  Finally, Part VI provides a temporary solution for 
small businesses seeking external capital, by way of Rule 506(c), and invites 
Congress to direct the SEC to revisit its adopted regulations.  Part VII 
concludes. 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE SECURITIES REGULATION 
Securities regulation has existed in the United States since the mid-
nineteenth century.9  Beginning in the early twentieth century, people began 
to realize the need for a more comprehensive securities regulation regime.10  
Although the federal government dominates the realm of securities 
regulation today, the earliest securities regulations regimes were under the 
exclusive control of the states,11 and these regulations are now known as 
“Blue Sky” laws.12  These state Blue Sky laws placed several burdens on the 
 
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260); Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2016).   
 7  Campbell, supra note 1, at 327 (“[I]t is impossible to conclude that an efficient and 
fair allocation of capital in the case of small businesses is facilitated by imposing fifty-plus 
separate and independent securities registration regimes on small businesses when they search 
for external capital.”).   
 8  Norman S. Poser, A Monument to a Regulatory System, 92 MICH. L. REV 1797, 1800 
(1994) (“The complex and interesting history of federal securities regulation goes back to the 
common law of England and the United States and to English statutes of the nineteenth 
century, as well as to the efforts of state legislatures in the early twentieth century 
to regulate the securities markets in order to protect investors.”).   
 9  See, e.g., Lindeen, 825 F.3d at 648 (citing Act of May 21, 1852, ch. 303, 1852 Mass. 
Acts 208) (“[R]equiring railroad companies chartered in Massachusetts to file certificates 
‘stating that all of the stock named in [their] charter has been subscribed for by responsible 
parties, and that twenty per cent[ ] of the par value of each and every share of the stock thereof 
has been actually paid into the treasury of the company’”).  
 10  See generally STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS 1690–1860 (2002).   
 11  The Supreme Court, by 1917, had affirmed the constitutionality of these state laws.  
See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1917) (describing the origins of state 
Blue Sky laws); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 562 (1917) 
(describing early Blue Sky laws in North Dakota); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 
571–72 (1917) (describing early Blue Sky laws in Michigan).   
 12  Elisabeth Keller, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities 
KLOEBLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2018  5:21 PM 
2018] COMMENT 537 
sale of securities, including pre-sale registration of the securities with the 
state and pre-sale “merit” reviews of the security sale.13  The hurdles created 
by state Blue Sky laws remain in place today14 and are a main source of 
failure for Regulation A+. 
III. HISTORY OF REGULATION A 
The SEC first adopted Regulation A in 1936,15 but the statutory basis 
for Regulation A can be found in section 3(b) of the Securities Act.16  When 
it was originally adopted by the Securities Act, section 3(b) allowed the SEC 
to adopt exemptions that were “in the public interest” for offerings of up to 
$100,000.17  By 1945, it became clear that this exemption was underutilized 
so Congress tripled the limit to $300,000.18  Congress again raised the limit 
to $500,000 in 1970, but the exemption was still ignored.19  In 1978, 
Congress raised the limit twice, first to $1,500,000 and then to $2,000,000 a 
few months later.20  Finally, in 1980 Congress raised the limit for offerings 
under section 3(b) to $5,000,000 where it remained until the recent adoption 
of Regulation A+.21 
When adopted, Regulation A was heavily predicated on exemptions 
from the usual filing and disclosure requirements of other types of 
offerings.22  Instead of the typical registration statement and prospectus 
required under other registered offerings, Regulation A required the issuer 
to file an offering statement with the SEC and to provide investors with an 
offering circular.23  These requirements were theoretically designed to save 
small businesses money when trying to raise capital by reducing disclosure 
obligations and thereby reducing the cost of conducting an offering.24 
 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 331 (1988) (“State 
securities statutes were known as ‘blue sky’ laws, because some lawmakers believed that ‘if 
securities legislation was not passed, financial pirates would sell citizens everything in [the] 
state but the blue sky.’” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).   
 13  Campbell, supra note 1, at 330, 338.   
 14  Id.at 335–44.   
 15  Securities Act Release No. 33-627, 1936 WL 30895 (Jan. 21, 1936).   
 16  15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012).   
 17  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §3(b), 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
77c (2012)); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A 
Moderate Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 100 (2006).   
 18  Act of May 15, 1945, ch. 122, 59 Stat. 167.   
 19  Act of Dec. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-565, 84 Stat. 1480.   
 20  Compare Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
283, § 18, 92 Stat. 275 (1978), with Act of Oct. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-425, § 2, 92 Stat. 962.   
 21  Small Business Investment Incentive Acts of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, tit. III, § 301, 
94 Stat. 2275 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012)).   
 22  Campbell, supra note 1, at 329.   
 23  Commodity and Securities Exchanges,17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)–(2) (2005).   
 24  Campbell, supra note 1, at 329.   
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The offering statement, which needs to be filed with the SEC, is 
composed of four parts: the notification, the offering circular, the exhibits, 
and the signature page.25  The offering circular, which is circulated to 
potential investors, contains the basic investment information and has proven 
to be prohibitively expensive.26  The two main components of the offering 
circular are the narrative statement and the prescribed financial 
information.27  The narrative statement in the offering circular was one of the 
bigger barriers for small businesses seeking external capital because of the 
costs associated with preparation.28  The financial disclosures included both 
a one-year balance sheet and income information for two years, which added 
to the costs of a Regulation A offering.29  These requirements undermined 
the purpose of Regulation A, as “the costs involved in preparing and 
distributing the offering statement and the offering circular are significant 
relative to the yields from a smaller offering.  These relative costs are an 
important reason why small businesses seeking small amounts of capital so 
rarely rely on Regulation A.”30 
Regulation A was also limited in scope by conditions involving both 
the issuer and persons who are associated with the issuer.31  First, the issuer 
must have been an entity “organized under the laws of the United States or 
Canada, or any State, Province, Territory or possession thereof, or the 
District of Columbia, with its principal place of business in the United States 
or Canada.”32  An issuer also could not be a reporting company that is subject 
to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33  Regulation 
A was also limited to an issuer that is “not a development stage company 
that either has no specific business plan or purpose, or has indicated that its 
business plan is to merge with an unidentified company or companies.”34  
 
 25  See Form 1-A, 57 Fed. Reg. 36, 473, 36,476 (Aug. 13, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 
239.90); Campbell, supra note, 17 at 104.   
 26  Campbell, supra note 17, at 105.   
 27  Form 1-A, Part F/S, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,491.   
 28  Campbell, supra note 17, at 105 (discussing how extensive disclosure requirements 
and counsel’s lack of familiarity with Form 1-A drove up costs associated with the narrative 
statement).   
 29  Id. at 106.   
 30  Id.   
 31  Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992) (to be codified at 17 
CFR Parts 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, and 260).   
 32  Id. at 36,468; see also id. at 36,443 (explaining the addition of Canadian entities 
because although “Canadians have not relied on the exemption, the changes in Regulation A 
may make the exemption more attractive not only to domestic but also Canadian 
companies.”). 
 33  Id. at 36,468; see also Campbell, supra note 17, at 103 (explaining that “[t]he point of 
this requirement is apparently to force public offerings by larger, 1934 Act companies onto 
either S Forms or SB Forms, with their more extensive disclosure requirements”). 
 34  Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,468; see WILLIAM J. HICKS, EXEMPTED 
KLOEBLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2018  5:21 PM 
2018] COMMENT 539 
Another qualifier for issuers seeking an offering under Regulation A was that 
issuers could not be investment companies under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940,35 nor could Regulation A be used for the issuance of “fractional 
undivided interests in oil or gas rights.”36 
One of the most well-known exclusions under Regulation A was the 
“bad boy” provision.37  This provision excluded issuers from the use of 
Regulation A if the issuer, or certain persons associated with the issuer,38 
committed any of the prohibited acts that were enumerated by the SEC.39  
These prohibited acts included a number of securities-related felonies,40 and 
were clearly put in place with investor protection in mind. 
Historical use of Regulation A was also heavily curbed by another 
significant factor, the cost of compliance with state Blue Sky law 
regulations.41  Congress had contemplated preempting state securities 
regulations for offerings under Regulation A to allow the SEC to have 
exclusive authority over Regulation A offerings.42  These efforts, however, 
failed and the Blue Sky laws continued to act as a barrier for many small 
businesses seeking external capital.43 
The reason that state Blue Sky laws are so detrimental to Regulation A 
offerings, “is that a small business making a Regulation A offering is still 
obliged in each state in which it offers its securities either to register the 
securities with the state or qualify for a state exemption to the state 
registration obligation.”44  Exemptions for small businesses under state Blue 
Sky law regulations were few and far between.  One example is the state 
small offering exemption; however, that exemption destroyed the benefits of 
Regulation A offerings because it limits the number of offerees and 
 
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 §§ 6.27–6.38 (2001) (providing a history 
of this exemption and explaining that it applied only to offerings by “blank check” companies 
which are companies “that [have] no specific business or plan except to locate and acquire a 
presently unknown business or opportunity”). 
 35  Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,468. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Campbell, supra note 17, at 103. 
 38  HICKS, supra note 34, at §§ 6.10–6.26.  
 39  17 C.F.R. § 230.262(a) (2005). 
 40  See id.  
 41  Campbell, supra note 1, at 330. 
 42  An earlier House version of the legislation that became the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act  would have preempted state control over nearly all securities offerings, 
except offerings made under the intrastate exemption.  Capital Markets Deregulation and 
Liberalization Act of 1995, H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995).  If this version had been adopted, 
the Commission would have had exclusive authority in all Regulation A offerings.  Campbell, 
supra note 1, at 345–46.  
 43  Campbell, supra note 1, at 335–44. 
 44  Campbell, supra note 17, at 107. 
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purchasers.45 
States eventually adopted three different schemes for registering 
Regulation A offerings, but none of these schemes proved effective.  The 
firstand more expensive—scheme was the traditional registration by 
qualification.46  Another ineffective scheme that many states adopted was 
implementing a new registration form, the Small Corporate Offerings 
Registration (SCOR) form, for offerings of up to $1,000,000.47  The SCOR 
form was specifically designed to be simpler and less expensive than 
registration by qualification,48 yet both failed to gain any traction despite 
their benefits.49 
The third scheme adopted by a number of states was registration by 
coordination.50  Registration by coordination was alleged to be the most 
effective scheme because it allows issuers to meet the state requirements by 
filing their Form 1-A with the State, which greatly reduces compliance 
costs.51  Even this scheme, however, has its drawbacks, as indicated by 
Professor Rutheford Campbell: 
[P]ermitting state registration by coordination for Regulation A 
offerings does not necessarily protect the issuer from the loss of 
Regulation A benefits. Consider the “test the waters” provision of 
Regulation A. Under that rule, issuers are able to solicit 
indications of interest in a Regulation A offering before writing 
the Form 1-A, even though the activity otherwise would amount 
to an unauthorized “offer” of a security in violation of the 
provisions of the 1933 Act. The benefit to the issuer, of course, is 
that it can better gauge the demand for its securities, before 
investing the significant amount of money necessary to put 
together a Regulation A offering. Adopting a rule permitting a 
 
 45  UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(l) (1) 
(2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.410(1)(i) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.203(9) 
(West 1999) (less than thirty-six purchasers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(l)(1) (2004) (not 
to exceed twenty sales). 
 46  Campbell, supra note 17, at 107; see also 10 PA. CODE § 206.010 (2012) (provides an 
example of all the necessary filings and materials that make this scheme prohibitively 
expensive). 
 47  Campbell, supra note 17, at 107–08; Form U-7: Small Company Offering Registration 
Form, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/scor-overvi
ew/scor-forms/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).   
 48  Campbell, supra note 17, at 108. See also SCOR Statement of Policy, NASAA (Apr. 
26, 1998), http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/scor-overview/scor-
statement-of-policy/.  
 49  Campbell, supra note 17, at 108 (“Although both registration by qualification and 
registration through the SCOR form preserve the right of the issuer to make an unlimited 
number of offers and sales, the additional costs and complexities added to a Regulation A 
offering apparently overwhelm any benefits to the issuer.”). 
 50  See 10 PA. CODE § 205.02.  
 51  Campbell, supra note 17, at 110 (footnotes omitted). 
KLOEBLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2018  5:21 PM 
2018] COMMENT 541 
Regulation A offering to be registered by coordination does not 
necessarily affect the determination of whether prefiling testing of 
the water activity amounts to an illegal offer under state law. Thus, 
a state permitting registration by coordination could take the 
position that prefiling testing of the water activity amounts to 
illegal gun jumping under state law. The small business using 
Regulation A in such a case would have to forego the benefits of 
testing the waters in order meet state blue sky law requirements.52 
The states’ failures to create an effective scheme to accommodate 
Regulation A offerings demonstrates how necessary it is to change the way 
small businesses seek external capital. 
IV. REGULATION A+ FINAL RULES 
This Section will provide an overview of what the SEC changed, and 
failed to change, when adopting the regulations that give Regulation A+ its 
guidelines.  From this overview, this Comment will outline in detail the 
newly adopted rules and how the SEC has justified them. 
A. Regulation A+ Basics 
When considering what steps to take to effectively implement section 
3(b)(2), the SEC noted that the JOBS Act did not authorized it to amend the 
current Regulation A statutory authority,53 and, therefore, wanted to build 
off of and preserve Regulation A’s underlying provisions.54  The 
Commission explained that the: 
[P]rimary objective is to implement Section 401 of the JOBS Act 
by expanding and updating Regulation A in a manner that makes 
public offerings of up to $50 million less costly and more flexible 
while providing a framework for regulatory oversight to protect 
investors. In so doing, we have crafted a revision of Regulation A 
that both promotes small company capital formation and provides 
for meaningful investor protection. We believe that issuers, 
particularly small businesses, benefit from having a wide range of 
capital-raising strategies available to them, and that an expanded 
and updated Regulation A could serve as a valuable option that 
augments the exemptions from registration more frequently relied 
upon, thereby facilitating capital formation for small businesses.55 
 
 52  Id. 
 53  Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926 (Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260). 
 54  See id. 
 55  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,892 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260).  
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To carry out its goal, the SEC implemented a two-tier system for 
Regulation A+ offerings, similar to the framework found in Regulation D.56  
The SEC explained, “[t]he proposal[] for offerings under Tier 1 and Tier 2 
build on current Regulation A, and preserve, with some modifications, 
existing provisions regarding issuer eligibility, offering circular contents, 
testing the waters, and ‘bad actor’ disqualification.”57  Therefore, to begin 
the overview, two new definitions must first be explained: Tier 1 offerings 
and Tier 2 offerings.58 
Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings have a limit on the amount of capital 
sought in a twelve-month period.59  Under a Tier 1 offering, issuers are 
limited to seeking $20 million within a twelve-month period.60  For issuers 
involved in a Tier 2 offering, they are limited to seeking no more than $50 
million in a twelve-month period.61  It is of note that there is no requirement 
for the minimal amount of capital being sought to initiate a Tier 2 offering.62  
This means that an issuer seeking only $1 million in external capital from 
the sale of securities may seek a Tier 2 offering, provided all other criteria 
are met.63 
B. Qualified Issuers under Regulation A+ 
Whether conducting a Tier 1 or Tier 2 offering, issuers are subject to 
the same qualifications and restrictions.64  As discussed in more detail later 
in this Comment, these limitations on the nature of issuers who may take 
advantage of Regulation A+ have been an area of controversy. 
Just as under Regulation A, issuers must be “an entity organized under 
the laws of the United States or Canada, or any State, Province, Territory or 
possession thereof, or the District of Columbia, with its principal place of 
business in the United States or Canada.”65  When making its decision on 
whether to allow foreign issuers, the SEC noted, “[a]s its name suggests, one 
goal of the JOBS Act was the creation of jobs within the United States.”66  
 
 56  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.505, 230.506 (2005) (commonly known as Rules 504, 
505, and 506).  
 57  Id. 
 58  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (laying out the basic characteristics of Tier 1 and Tier 2). 
 59  17 C.F.R. § 230.251. 
 60  Id.; § 230.251(a)(1); see also Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional 
Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926, 3,927 (Jan. 
23, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260).  The proposed limit 
under Tier 1 offerings was originally capped at only $5 million.  Id. at 3,929. 
 61  17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2). 
 62  Id. 
 63  See id.; Campbell, supra note 1, at 331 n.37. 
 64  17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b). 
 65  Id. at (b)(1). 
 66  Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
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Similarly, just as under Regulation A, issuers must not: 
[B]e subject to section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934;67  . . . be a development stage company that either has no 
specific business plan or purpose, or has indicated that its business 
plan is to merge with or acquire an unidentified company or 
companies;68 . . . be an investment company registered or required 
to be registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or a 
business development company as defined in section 2(a)(48) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940;69 . . . be issuing fractional 
undivided interests in oil or gas rights, or a similar interest in other 
mineral rights;70 or . . . be disqualified under Rule 262.71 
From the final rules adopted by the SEC, it becomes clear that not much 
has changed with regard to issuer qualification. 
The lack of updates and expansion to Regulation A+’s issuer 
qualifications can be attributed to the SEC’s concern with investor 
protection.72  As explained by the SEC, the goal was to establish continuity 
with the Regulation A regime.73  The SEC was hesitant to expand the scope 
of eligible issuers under Regulation A+, and instead chose the allegedly 
“prudent” route of waiting to see the impact of Regulation A+ before making 
any expansion of eligible issuers.74 
While not much has changed to the original qualifications of a 
Regulation A issuer, the SEC did add two additional restrictions to 
Regulation A+ regarding who can qualify as an issuer.75  The first restriction 
applies to issuers who have participated in previous Regulation A+ 
offerings.76  It requires that in order to remain eligible, the potential issuer 
must have filed all on-going reporting requirements under Regulation A+ for 
 
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926, 3,932 (Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260)  
 67  § 230.251(b)(2). 
 68  Id. § 230.251(b)(3).  
 69  Id. § 230.251(b)(4) (internal cross-reference omitted).  
 70  Id. § 230.251(b)(5).  
 71  Id. § 230.251(b)(8) (also known as the “bad boy” restriction).  
 72  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,811 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260). 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. (“We are concerned . . . about the implications of extending issuer eligibility before 
the [SEC] has the ability to assess the impact of [Regulation A+]. [W]e believe it prudent to 
defer expanding the categories of eligible issuers (for example, by including non-Canadian 
foreign issuers, BDCs, or Exchange Act reporting companies) until the [SEC] has had the 
opportunity to observe the use of the amended Regulation A exemption and assess any new 
market practices as they develop.”).  
 75  § 230.251 at (b)(6)–(7). 
 76  Id. § 230.251(b)(7).  
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the two years preceding a new Regulation A+ offering.77  The second 
restriction mandates that “issuers subject to orders by the Commission 
entered pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Exchange Act within a five-year 
period immediately preceding the filing of the offering statement will not be 
eligible to conduct an offering.”78  These two additional restrictions, while 
justified by investor protection, do nothing to expand the market for 
Regulation A+, and only act to further complicate the originally 
overregulated Regulation A framework. 
C. Disclosure and Filing Requirements 
With regard to the disclosure and filing requirements of Regulation A+, 
the SEC made a number of significant changes from Regulation A that affect 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings differently.  There are still, however, a number of 
basic requirements that apply to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings.79  For 
example, both Tier 1 and Tier 2 are still subject to the same basic filing and 
disclosure requirements.80  These basic requirements are still procedurally 
similar to the filing and disclosure requirements of other registered 
offerings,81 since no offers can be made in a Regulation A+ offering until an 
offering statement has been filed with the SEC.82  Only then can an issuer 
solicit oral offers for the securities through the use of a preliminary offering 
circular.83  Finally, in order to sell the Regulation A+ securities, the offering 
statement must be qualified by the SEC.84 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings also have access to an updated version of 
the “test the waters” provision.85  This provision acts as an exception to the 
general prohibition of pre-filing offers of Regulation A+ securities.86  Under 
 
 77  Id.; Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities 
Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg.  at 21,811 (The SEC reasoned that “[t]his requirement will 
benefit investors by providing them with more information, with respect to issuers that have 
previously made a Regulation A offering, to consider when making an investment decision, 
facilitate the development of an efficient secondary market in such securities, and enhance 
[the SEC’s] ability to analyze and observe the Regulation A market.”).  
 78  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,811–12 (seeking investor protection “by excluding issuers 
with a demonstrated history of delinquent filings under the Exchange Act from the pool of 
eligible issuers under Regulation A.”). 
 79  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d).  
 80  Id. 
 81  Campbell, supra note 1, at 332.  
 82  § 230.251(d)(1)(i).  
 83  Id. 
 84  Campbell, supra note 1, at 332 (explaining that the qualification of the offering 
statement is “roughly equivalent to a final registration statement that is declared effective by 
the Commission”). 
 85  17 C.F.R. § 230.255. 
 86  Id. 
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the “test the waters” provision, Regulation A+ issuers are able to reach out 
to potential investors and gauge their interest in the offering, before incurring 
any expenses related to filing.87  The SEC based this provision off the 
rationale that “allowing issuers to gauge interest through expanded testing 
the waters will reduce uncertainty about whether an offering could be 
completed successfully.”88  There are still, however, a number of limits on 
what the communications may include.89  Under the current regulations, 
there are several restrictions on the content of the communications, 
including: (1) the communication cannot state that money or consideration 
is being solicited;90 (2) the communication must state that no offer to buy the 
securities can be accepted and no part of the purchase price can be accepted 
until after the offering statement has been qualified by the SEC;91 and (3) the 
communication must state “that a person’s indication of interest involves no 
obligation or commitment of any kind.”92 
Where Tier 1 and Tier 2 begin to differ is with regard to the nature and 
extent of the disclosures that must be made for a Regulation A+ offering.93  
There are two general types of disclosures that must be made by an issuer 
under both Tier 1 and Tier 2: ex ante disclosures (at the time of the offering) 
and ex post disclosures (following the completion of the offering).94  When 
looking at the nature of the ex ante and ex post disclosures under Tier 1 and 
Tier 2, it is obvious that Tier 2 offerings require significantly more 
disclosures.95  This “scaled” disclosure regime was put in place by the SEC 
as a balanced approach to its goals of capital formation and investor 
protection.96 
 
 
 87  Id.; Campbell, supra note 1, at 331. 
 88  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,882 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260) (wanting this provision to be “useful for smaller 
issuers, especially early-stage issuers, first-time issuers, issuers in lines of business 
characterized by a considerable degree of uncertainty, and other issuers with a high degree of 
information asymmetry.”). 
 89  17 C.F.R. § 230.255(b). 
 90  Id. § 230.255(b)(1) (The communication must also state that if any consideration is 
received, that it will not be accepted.). 
 91  Id. § 230.255(b)(2) (The communication must also make it clear that any offer can be 
freely revoked before the end of the qualification process and notice of acceptance has been 
received.). 
 92  Id. § 230.255(b)(3). 
 93  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829. 
 94  Campbell, supra note 1, at 332. 
 95  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829. 
 96  Id. 
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One type of an ex ante disclosure requirement is the narrative disclosure 
requirement that must be made under both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings.97  The 
narrative disclosures are largely the same under both Tier 1 and Tier 2, but 
there are a few differences.98  In general, Form 1-A includes fourteen items 
for narrative disclosures.99  Where Tier 1 and Tier 2 narrative disclosures 
differ is in the disclosure of executive compensation.100  Under Tier 1 
offerings, the issuer may provide the aggregate amount of executive 
compensation for the three highest paid executives.101  On the other hand, 
under Tier 2 offerings, the executive compensation data must be provided on 
an individual basis for each of the three highest paid executives.102  As 
explained by the SEC, this difference will “alter the format of, but not the 
ultimate aggregate amount of information required to be disclosed in . . . Tier 
1 offerings.”103  Ultimately, these narrative disclosures are comparatively 
similar to the disclosures required under Form S-1 and therefore serve as a 
point of controversy.104 
The required financial disclosures under Tier 1 and Tier 2 also differ 
significantly.  Under Tier 1, both the ex ante and the ex post disclosures are 
drastically less burdensome.105  At the time a Regulation A+ offering is filed 
under Tier 1, the issuer must provide two years of financial statements.106  
These financial statements, however, do not need to be audited nor do they 
need to be prepared in accordance with Regulation S-X.107  As the SEC 
explains, this lack of an auditing requirement was justified by “the relatively 
low maximum offering size for Tier 1”108 and concerns over “Tier 1 offerings 
 
 97  Form 1-A: Regulation A Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, at 10–
23, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [hereinafter 
Form 1-A]. 
 98  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829; see Form 1-A, supra note 97. 
 99  See Form 1-A, supra note 97. 
 100  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829; Form 1-A, supra note 97. 
 101  Form 1-A, supra note 97 at 19 (listing Item 11: Compensation of Directors and 
Executive Officers).  
 102  Id. 
 103  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829. 
 104  See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation of Small Business Capital 
Formation: The Impact—If Any—of the Jobs Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815 (2014). 
 105  See Form 1-A, supra note 97; Form 1-SA: Semiannual Report Pursuant to Regulation 
A or Special Financial Report Pursuant to Regulation A, https://www.sec.gov/files/form1-
sa.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Form 1-SA]; Form 1-Z: Exit Report Under 
Regulation A, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-z.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) 
[hereinafter Form 1-Z].  
 106  Form 1-A, supra note 97. 
 107  Id.; Campbell, supra note 104, at 820. 
 108  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
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becoming not cost-effective.”109  The only ex post requirement for Tier 1 is 
the filing of an “exit report” with the SEC.110  The SEC justified the 
imposition of an exit report requirement on Tier 1 offerings because the form 
“contains limited summary information about the issuer and the completed 
offering and, therefore, should not impose substantial additional compliance 
costs on the issuer.”111 
Tier 2 offerings, on the other hand, are burdened with significantly 
more ex ante and ex post disclosure requirements.  At the time of filing, an 
issuer conducting a Tier 2 offering must provide audited financial 
statements.112  The SEC made the decision to include this requirement to 
protect investors.113  The Commission reasoned that by increasing the 
accuracy and quality of the financial statements, the relative cost of the 
sought capital would be lowered and thus benefit the issuers as well as the 
investors.114  Additionally, these audited financials must be audited in 
accordance with “either the auditing standards of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (referred to as U.S. Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards or GAAS) or the standards of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).”115  The SEC adopted this 
choice of accounting standards to increase flexibility and lower compliance 
costs for issuers.116 
The other significant burden faced by Tier 2 offerings is the extensive 
ex post disclosure requirements.117  Tier 2 offerings face a periodic filing 
regime that presents a similar burden to the requirements found in the 1934 
Act.118  Currently: 
An issuer subject to the Tier 2 periodic and current event 
reporting . . . is required to provide information annually on Form 
 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,881. 
 109  Id. 
 110  17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (2005); see Form 1-Z, supra note 105. 
 111  17 C.F.R. § 230.257; Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,884. 
 112  17 C.F.R. § 230.257; Form 1-A, supra note 97 at 4; Amendments for Small and 
Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 
21,807.  
 113  17 C.F.R. § 230.257; Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,881.  
 114  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,881 
 115  Id.; see Form 1-A, supra note 97, at 4.  
 116  17 C.F.R. § 230.257; Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,881.  
 117 17 C.F.R. § 230.257; see Form 1-K, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-k.pdf; 
Form 1-SA, supra note 105; Form 1-U: Current Report Pursuant to Regulation A, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-u.pdf; Form 1-Z (exit report). 
 118  Campbell, supra note 1 at 334; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.257. 
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1-K, including the issuer’s business and business plan; conflicts 
of interest and related party transactions; executive and director 
compensation; financial condition and results of operations; and 
audited financial statements. The semiannual update on Form 1-
SA consists primarily of unaudited, interim financial statements 
for the issuer’s first two fiscal quarters and information regarding 
the issuer’s financial condition and results of operations. The 
current event reporting on Form 1-U requires issuers to disclose 
certain major developments, including changes of control; 
changes in the principal executive officer and principal financial 
officer; fundamental changes in the nature of business; material 
transactions or corporate events; unregistered sales of five percent 
or more of outstanding equity securities; changes in the issuer’s 
certifying accountant; and non-reliance on previous financial 
statements.119 
What makes this ongoing disclosure requirement for Tier 2 offerings 
even more burdensome is the fact that the issuer must comply with them until 
the company becomes subject to the requirements of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 or the shares are held by less than 300 shareholders of record.120  
In addition, in order to be released from the ongoing reporting requirements, 
the issuer must have completed at least one full cycle of the reporting regime 
and then filed an exit report with the SEC.121  Therefore, even if the Tier 2 
securities are held by less than 300 shareholders of record the issuer must 
bear the cost of doing another full year of reporting.122  The SEC recognized 
that the option to cease the ongoing reporting would be attractive to some 
issuers because of the relative cost of compliance.123  The SEC, however, 
decided to restrict this option since it “might be costly for investors because 
it will decrease the amount of information available about the issuer, making 
it more difficult to monitor the issuer and accurately price its securities or to 
find a trading venue that will allow liquidation of the investment.”124 
 
 
 119  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,806.  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.257; 17 C.F.R. § 239.91 
(Form 1-K); 17 C.F.R. § 239.92 (Form 1-SA); 17 C.F.R. § 239.93 (Form 1-U).  
 120  17 C.F.R. § 230.257(d)(1)–(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1 (defining shareholder of 
record). 
 121  17 C.F.R. § 230.257(d)(2) (stating reporting requirements “shall be suspended for such 
class of securities immediately upon filing with the Commission an exit report on Form 1–
Z if the issuer of such class has filed all reports due pursuant to this rule before the date of 
such Form 1–Z filing”). 
 122  Campbell, supra note 1, at 335. 
 123  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,854. 
 124  Id. 
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D. State Blue Sky Law Preemption 
The other major distinction between Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings is the 
federal preemption of state Blue Sky law regulations.  Regulation A+ 
currently preempts state securities laws for Tier 2 offerings, but does not 
protect Tier 1 offerings.125  This relationship to state securities laws is 
important because many commentators and critics have identified state Blue 
Sky law regulations as the main cause of Regulation A’s continued failure.126  
Originally, the SEC proposed a preemption framework that would have 
preempted state securities laws for Tier 2 offerings and would have 
preempted state securities laws for offers and not sales for Tier 1 offerings.127  
The SEC, however, abandoned this framework and refused to preempt any 
part of Tier 1 offerings.128 
When Congress passed the JOBS Act, it granted the SEC broad 
statutory authority to create exemptions for Regulation A+ securities with 
regard to state Blue Sky law regulations.129  Congress recognized the 
drawbacks of forcing small businesses to register their securities with state 
authority and how that could stifle the purpose of the JOBS Act, increasing 
access to external capital for small businesses.130  Therefore, Congress, when 
adopting the JOBS Act, passed a statutory regime that preempts all state 
authority over a “covered security.”131 
To further emphasize the importance of capital formation for small 
businesses, Congress gave the SEC wide latitude in defining the scope of 
covered securities.132  Congress created this latitude by adopting the 
following language: “A security is a covered security . . . as defined by the 
Commission by rule. In prescribing such rule, the Commission may define 
the term ‘qualified purchaser’ differently with respect to different categories 
of securities, consistent with the public interest and the protection of 
investors.”133  Therefore the SEC was given two main directives: (1) 
 
 125  Id. at 21,856; 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.256. 
 126  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839 SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592113.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) [hereinafter GAO 
REPORT] 
 127  Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926, 3,968 (Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260).  
 128  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,856.  
 129  See 15 U.S.C. § 77r. 
 130  15 U.S.C. § 77c; see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A and the Jobs Act: A 
Failure to Resuscitate, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 317 (2012). 
 131  15 U.S.C. § 77r. 
 132  See Campbell, supra note 1, at 330. 
 133  15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3). 
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establish its own definition of a “qualified purchaser” to decrease the cost of 
compliance with state Blue Sky laws; and (2) adopt different definitions of 
“qualified purchasers” for different categories of securities, which provides 
flexibility with regard to investor protection.134  The only limitation on these 
two directives was “the public interest and the protection of investors.”135 
In the final rules adopted by the SEC, “a ‘qualified purchaser’ means 
any person to whom securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2 
offering of this Regulation A.”136  This means that state Blue Sky laws are 
preempted only in a Tier 2 offering, while Tier 1 offerings are still subject to 
state regulation.  To even be qualified as a purchaser under Tier 2, the 
purchaser must be an accredited investor,137 or the purchase price must be no 
more than ten percent of the purchaser’s annual income, if a natural 
person,138 or the previous fiscal year’s revenue, if a non-natural person.139  
By restricting Tier 2 offerings to accredited investors, the SEC has rendered 
the benefit of Blue Sky law preemption, along with all of Regulation A+’s 
other benefits, virtually useless. 
When adopting this language, the SEC unsuccessfully tried to strike a 
balance between the protection of investors and decreasing the relative costs 
of compliance with state securities laws.140  The SEC explained that: 
For Tier 2 offerings, the additional disclosure, audited financial 
statements, and transactional requirements relative to Tier 1 
offerings are expected to provide an additional layer of investor 
protection, thus reducing the need for, and the expected benefits 
of, state review. . . . [While] Tier 1 offerings will face significantly 
lower offering costs as a result of not being subjected to the 
requirements of audited financial statements and ongoing 
reporting in the final rules. For these offerings, the local 
knowledge of state regulators is anticipated to add value to the 
review process to the extent that the issuer and the investor base 
are more likely to be localized. Thus, state qualification is more 
likely to have incremental investor protection benefits in Tier 1 
offerings.141 
 
 134  See id. 
 135  Id. 
 136  17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2005). 
 137  17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C).  The SEC adopted the same definition for “accredited 
investors” as found in Rule 501 of Regulation D, which includes institutional investors, 
executive officers of the issuer, and high net worth individuals.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501. 
 138  § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C)(1). 
 139  § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C)(2). 
 140  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,856 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260).  
 141  Id. 
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The SEC also focused on the smaller and more local nature of Tier 1 
offerings as a reason in favor of state oversight.142  It is likely that the SEC, 
when creating this framework, was trying to avoid challenges from those 
seeking a more prominent role for State authority in the regulation of 
securities.  However, several states have already challenged this regulatory 
scheme.143  In the end, the SEC created an unworkable framework, the 
purpose of which undermines the reasoning used to adopt the other portions 
of Regulation A+. 
VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section of the Comment will explain the superior Regulation A+ 
solutions that were overlooked and deliberately ignored by the SEC when 
formulation the final rules.  Similar to the previous section, this discussion 
will be broken down into issuer qualifications, registration and reporting, and 
preemption of State securities laws.  This Comment will identify and explain 
specific solutions that were presented to the SEC by commenters and show 
how they are superior to the final rules of Regulation A+.144 
A. Easing Issuer Qualifications 
One of the provisions of Regulation A+ that received some heavy 
criticism was the requirement that issuers be “an entity organized under the 
laws of the United States or Canada, or any State, Province, Territory or 
possession thereof, or the District of Columbia, with its principal place of 
business in the United States or Canada.”145  During the commenting process, 
several authorities expressed their concerns to the SEC that this requirement 
unnecessarily excluded other foreign issuers from entering the United States 
 
 142  Id. at 21,886 (“Tier 1 offerings are more likely to be concentrated in fewer states, the 
cost of complying with state review procedures is likely to be diminished for these types of 
offerings.”). 
 143  See Lindeen v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., 825 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (The chief 
securities regulators for Massachusetts and Montana sued the SEC challenging Regulation 
A+’s definition of “qualified purchasers.”  They argued that, because the SEC declined to 
adopt a qualified-purchaser definition limited to investors with sufficient wealth, revenue or 
financial sophistication to protect their interests without state protection, Regulation A+ fails 
both parts of the United States Supreme Court’s statutory construction standards enunciated 
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984).  The D.C. Circuit Court upheld the SEC’s definition as within the scope of their 
administrative authority.).   
 144  For submitted comments, see U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Comments on Proposed 
Rule: Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 
3(b) of the Securities Act, SEC (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-
13/s71113.shtml. 
 145   17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b)(1) (2005). 
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capital market.146  The International Securities and Capital Markets 
Committee of the American Bar Association (ABA) was especially critical 
of this limitation on Regulation A+ issuers.147  The ABA believed that 
maintaining Regulation A’s status quo for the eligibility of foreign issuers 
undermined the policy concerns behind the adoption of the JOBS Act––job 
creation and economic growth in the United States.148 
This criticism is well deserved and indicates a major flaw in the final 
rule of Regulation A+.  Currently, a Canadian issuer with its principle place 
of business in Canada, with little to no business inside the United States, is 
able to conduct a Regulation A+ offering.  But, a foreign, non-Canadian 
issuer that conducts a large amount of business inside the United States 
cannot utilize Regulation A+ offerings.149  Despite its position and likelihood 
to spend capital inside the United States, the foreign non-Canadian issuer is 
ineligible under the current framework.150  Therefore, the SEC should revisit 
this qualification and amend it in a way that includes other foreign issuers.151 
B. Reducing Disclosure and Registration Requirements 
The disclosure and registration requirements, which the SEC adopted 
for Regulation A+, provide further examples of inefficient regulations that 
undermine the true purpose of this exemption.  Many commenters 
questioned the requirement that the financial statements provided on Form 
1-A be no older than nine months from the filing date.152  One criticism of 
this requirement is that it would be redundant and unnecessarily prohibitive 
for newly formed businesses.153  The final rules would require newly formed 
 
 146  Gabrielle Buckley, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and 
Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act (May 14, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-111.pdf; Jonathan Guest, Comment Letter 
on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 
3(b) of the Securities Act (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-
11.pdf. 
 147  Buckley, supra note 146, at 2. 
 148  Id.  
 149  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b)(1). 
 150  Id. 
 151  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,811 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260) (The SEC indicated that it would defer the inclusion 
of foreign non-Canadian issuers until the SEC could review the impact of Regulation A+. 
This hesitation, however, serves little purpose since the exclusion of these foreign non-
Canadian issuers is illogical.). 
 152  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21837; Ernst & Young, LLP, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the 
Securities Act, at 2 (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-83.pdf. 
 153  Ernst & Young, LLP, supra note 152, at 2. 
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businesses, which formed within nine months, to provide financial 
statements covering everything since the period of inception.154 
Commenters argued that instead of the current system, newly formed 
businesses should be provided an extra layer of relief for one main reason—
the benefit does not justify the cost.155  For newly formed businesses, the 
only kind of financial disclosure they are often able to make is a “seed 
balance sheet” which provides the investor with little meaningful 
information.156  Because these seed balance sheets are of little value, 
compelling newly formed businesses to incur the costs to prepare them 
makes little to no sense.157 
Instead, the SEC should adopt the proposed alternative and allow newly 
formed businesses to provide a narrative discussion of their financial 
condition and operations since their inception.158  This narrative disclosure 
alternative provides a far superior alternative that serves the interests of both 
the issuer and the investors.  Issuers would benefit from the reduced cost of 
preparing financial statements.  Investors would benefit from being provided 
information that is actually relevant to the financial condition of the newly 
formed company.  Therefore, the SEC should revisit the possibility of 
creating an exception for newly formed businesses. 
Another criticism of the disclosure and registration requirements is the 
nature and extent of the ongoing reporting requirements for Tier 2 
offerings.159  The reason for this criticism is that the ongoing requirements 
prevent issuers seeking a smaller amount of capital from conducting a Tier 
2 offering.160  As mentioned earlier, Tier 2 offerings have no minimum 
requirement for the amount of capital sought in order to conduct an 
offering.161  Therefore, the SEC opened the door for businesses seeking a 
small amount of capital to receive the benefits of Tier 2 offerings, but made 
it too expensive to be feasible.  When considering that Tier 2 offerings are 
exempt from state Blue Sky law regulations, while Tier 1 offerings are not 
exempt, there is a clear advantage for issuers seeking smaller amounts to 
 
 154  Id.  
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Under Tier 1 offerings, the balance sheet does not have to be audited so the costs of 
preparing the seed balance sheet will remain low.  See Form 1-A, supra note 97, at 24.  But, 
for Tier 2 offerings, which have an auditing requirement, the costs of having the seed balance 
sheet audited will disincentive this path for newly formed businesses.  See Form 1-A, supra 
note 97, at 26.  
 158  Ernst & Young, LLP supra note 152, at 2. 
 159  Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to Regulation 
A Implementing Title IV of the Jobs Act, at 8 (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/com
ments/s7-11-13/s71113-36.pdf.  
 160  Id. at 8–9. 
 161  17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2005).  
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conduct a Tier 2 offering. 
The prohibitive costs of the ongoing reporting requirements for Tier 2 
offerings led many commenters to call for a scaled disclosure regime.162  
Instead of requiring every business to meet the same reporting requirement, 
despite the amount of capital being raised, the SEC should have followed the 
recommendations of commenters and created a scaled disclosure scheme 
based on the issuer’s size and sophistication.163  Since Tier 2 offerings are a 
clear alternative for a fully registered Initial Public Offering, scaling the 
disclosure requirements would allow smaller businesses to enjoy the benefits 
of external capital without jeopardizing investor protection.164 
The SEC’s goal of protecting investors can still be achieved by 
simplifying, rather than abandoning, the required disclosures.  For example, 
it was suggested that the SEC could allow businesses to simplify expensive 
disclosures that do not provide much investor protection such as: generic risk 
factors, five years of executive biographical data, and executive 
compensation information.165  The SEC should, therefore, revisit the 
disclosure requirements of Tier 2 and implement a scaled approach based on 
the issuer’s size and sophistication. 
C. Complete Preemption of State Blue Sky Laws 
One of the most controversial portions of Regulation A+ is the 
relationship with state securities laws.  Before Regulation A+ was 
implemented, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
conducted a study to identify the factors that inhibited the use of the original 
Regulation A exemption.166  In a study called “Factors that May Affect 
Trends on Regulation A Offerings” (GAO study), the GAO reviewed 
Regulation A offerings from 1992 through 2011 and found a significant 
decline in the number of Regulation A offerings during that period.167  
Despite this decrease, the GAO study also found a sharp increase in the use 
of Regulation D as an alternative to Regulation A for small businesses.168  
The GAO study investigated the causes of this trend and determined that one 
 
 162  Morrison & Foerster LLP, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small 
and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act (Mar. 26, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-87.pdf. 
 163  Id. at 4; Campbell, supra note 159, at 8; Catherine Dixon, Comment Letter on 
Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) 
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of the most significant factors is compliance with state Blue Sky law 
regulations.169  The study noted that “[i]dentifying and addressing the 
securities registration requirements of individual states is both costly and 
time-consuming for small businesses.”170  Because the results of this study 
were readily available to the SEC when drafting the final rules of Regulation 
A+,171 there was a clear incentive to alleviate the burdens of state Blue Sky 
law regulations.  Instead, the SEC failed to create a workable framework for 
small businesses. 
Much of the criticism of Regulation A+ is derived from the lack of state 
Blue Sky law regulation preemption for Tier 1 offerings.  Essentially, 
nothing has changed for Tier 1 offerings and it requires virtually the same 
Blue Sky law compliance as the original Regulation A rules.172  Issuers under 
Tier 1 are still required to file a registration statement with the SEC, provide 
offering circulars to investors,173 and meet the registration requirements of 
all the states in which the issuer sells securities.174  It is, therefore, 
unreasonable to expect that Tier 1 offerings will be any more successful than 
their Regulation A predecessor, since the law has all the same basic 
requirements. 
Commenters are very critical of Tier 1’s lack of state Blue Sky law 
regulation preemption because of the lack of an efficient method to comply 
with every state’s laws.175  Proponents of Regulation A+’s current language 
point to the North American Securities Administrators Association’s 
(NASAA) Coordinated Review Program for Regulation A+.176  Pursuant to 
this coordinated review program, an issuer is able to file a single state 
registration statement that is then circulated to all the other states within the 
coordinated review program.177  At least one state is appointed to be the 
“lead” state, which reviews the registration statement for compliance with 
disclosure requirements.178  The lead state then prepares comments on the 
 
 169  Id. at 17–18. 
 170  Id. at 17. 
 171  Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,813 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260) (discussing the findings of the GAO report).  
 172  Campbell, supra note 1, at 340–43. 
 173  See 17 C.F.R §§ 230.251(d), 230.252–.253 (2005). 
 174  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (limiting preemption to Tier 2 offerings). 
 175  Campbell, supra note 1, at 340–43.  
 176  NASAA COORDINATED REVIEW OF REGULATION A OFFERINGS: REVIEW PROTOCOL, 
NASAA, (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/NASAA-
Regulation-A-Review-Protocol-final-Adopted-March-7.pdf. 
 177  Id. (stating that forty-nine of NASAA’s fifty-three members participate in the 
coordinated review program). 
 178  Id. (stating that a second lead state may be appointed if the securities are being offered 
in states that also have merit qualification requirements). 
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registration statement and then the registration statement, along with the 
comments, are circulated to all the participating states where the securities 
are being offered.179  All of the participating states are free to also add 
comments to the registration statement.180  Finally, the lead state returns all 
the comments to the issuer, who has to work with any state that made a 
comment to resolve each issue.181 
Comments submitted to the SEC during the rulemaking process were 
especially critical of the Coordinated Review Program and an alternative to 
preemption.182  Many felt that there were too many uncertainties and 
obstacles involved with the NASAA’s program.183  For example, issuers will 
still be required to comply with each state’s disclosure and merit review 
requirements with no clear benefit added by appointing a lead state.184  The 
lead examiner is unable to overrule or ignore comments from other states; 
therefore, having this single point of contact is only likely to add 
confusion.185  Another big problem is that the Coordinated Review Program 
does not provide relief from state filing fees, one of the larger costs of capital 
formation.186 
The next problem that many commenters identified is the delay that is 
caused by imposing the Coordinated Review Program rather than 
preemption.187  Because of the unclear and inconsistent nature of state Blue 
Sky law regulations,188 there are likely to be serious delays for Tier 1 issuers 
who are trying to issue securities in states with conflicting standards.  
Therefore, issuers are left with only a few options: spend the time and money 
to comply with each state’s requirements; spend the time and money to 
comply with the strictest existing state requirements in anticipation; spend 
the time and money to comply with the ex post and ex ante requirements of 
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 180  Id. (stating that ach state is able to make comments and then return those comments to 
the lead state). 
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Tier 2 offerings;189 or find an alternative to Regulation A+. 
Another aspect of Regulation A+ that commenters feel is weakened by 
the lack of preemption is the “test the waters” provision.190  When deciding 
to keep the “testing the waters” provision of pre-JOBS Regulation A, the 
SEC believed that this provision was key to the success of Regulation A+ 
offerings.191  The SEC noted that permitting “issuers to test the waters . . . 
will make the use of solicitation materials more beneficial for issuers. . . . 
[T]he final rules will generally reduce compliance burdens and entirely 
eliminate the filing requirement for issuers that, after testing the waters, 
decide not to proceed.”192  The “test the waters” provision, however, will 
likely go underutilized by Tier 1 issuers because many state Blue Sky laws 
prohibit such conduct.193  Any Tier 1 issuer seeking to conduct an offering 
across a broad number of states will likely have its hands tied and be unable 
to use the “test the waters” provision. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s failure to implement a workable framework of Title IV of 
the JOBS Act means that small businesses will continue to suffer from a lack 
of access to external markets.  There are millions of small businesses in the 
United States and other countries that would benefit immensely from gaining 
access to the capital markets.  Instead, these small businesses are left without 
a viable option other than traditional private placements.  Regulation A+, 
similar to its predecessor, suffers from over regulation for the sake of 
investor protection.  While the SEC’s concerns over fraud are legitimate and 
substantial, by trying to balance those concerns with the goal of allowing 
small businesses to raise capital, the final rules of Regulation A+ do nothing 
but split the baby.  Therefore, the SEC should revisit its adopted regulations 
and strike a more efficient balance between investor protection and capital 
formation. 
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